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ENGLISH NAVAL EXPANSION UNDER THE FRENCH THREAT, 1555-641 
 
Abstract 
In the autumn of 1555, after almost a decade of decay, the Marian regime 
decided to rebuild the English navy. With the encouragement of her Spanish 
husband, Queen Mary supported the new construction of three large 
carracks that would assist in the kingdom’s war against the substantial 
maritime forces of Henri II of France. Even with the potential insurance of 
Spanish military reinforcements from her husband, the French navy had 
expanded unprecedentedly under Henri II, forcing England’s maritime 
resources to their limits. This article will argue that it was these conflicts 
with France between 1557 and 1564 that forced the Marian and early 
Elizabethan institutions to endorse a policy of naval expansion.  
Keywords: Elizabethan navy, Marian navy, naval expansion, England, France, Henri II. 
 
Elizabeth I’s navy is widely upheld by historians as the tool that successfully defended 
England from the superior Spanish Armada. Infamous figures, including Sir Francis 
Drake and Sir John Hawkins, two of the queen’s most celebrated sea dogs, are now 
renowned English heroes. Moreover, the expansion of the realm’s maritime resources, 
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and the series of naval feats during the Spanish War, have carved Elizabeth I (1533-
1603) into history as the mother of the future Royal Navy, even if her willingness to use 
it was questioned at the time.2 
 This article however will not concern itself with this latter period of Elizabethan 
history, which has received wide attention since Sir Julian Corbett’s two volume series 
published in 1898.3 Instead, it covers a period that has drawn far less consideration both 
from scholarship and popular culture. The dramatic events at sea under the reign of 
Elizabeth I have generally overshadowed the accomplishments of her sister, Mary I 
(1516-58). Yet, it was the warships built under Mary and during the early years of 
Elizabeth’s reign, between 1555 and 1564, which would become some of the principal 
vessels used in the 1588 campaign. There is some irony in the fact that the warships 
constructed by Mary would help to defeat her husband’s armada. Indeed previous 
studies have given more attention to the periods both before and after these years, with 
Geoffrey Moorhouse and David Childs producing some of the most recent examples.4 
With this said, a study of English developments that considers naval expansion during 
the Marian and early Elizabethan regimes, and asks what the motivations behind these 
transformations were, will be fruitful in its results and will suggest an increased 
importance in these years. 
 
2 N.A.M. Rodger, ‘Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea-Power in English History’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, 14 (2004), 157. 
3 J.S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, 2 Volumes (London, 1898). 
4 G. Moorhouse, Great Harry’s Navy: How Henry VIII Gave England Sea Power (London, 2006); D. 
Childs, Pirate Nation: Elizabeth I and her Royal Sea Rovers (Barnsley, 2014). 
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 Tom Glasgow Jnr’s articles on the Marian and early Elizabethan wars for The 
Mariner’s Mirror are a vital contribution to the period under investigation, despite 
being over fifty years old and requiring revision.5 Glasgow was aware of the importance 
of the final years of Mary I’s reign to English naval advancement, and identified the 
pressure that Mary’s husband, Philip II of Spain, applied to the English Queen to 
develop her fleet for war against France.6 Yet, this view has since been contested, with 
both David Loades and N.A.M. Rodger suggesting that claims of Philip being the 
architect of the force that defeated him in 1588 are unsubstantiated and exaggerated.7 
Rodger has equally acknowledged the importance of the years prior to 1558 for naval 
developments, for Elizabeth inherited ‘a situation in which naval and maritime 
aggression were becoming identified with a heady combination of patriotism, 
Protestantism and private profit.’ 8  Early-sixteenth century conceptions of English 
patriotism were connected to the long history of Anglo-French conflict; yet, it was not 
only anti-French sentiments, but also fear, that fuelled English naval expansion. 
Scholarship on this issue has largely overlooked the international pressures imposed by 
the expansion of the French fleet during the mid-sixteenth century, and needs to 
 
5 T. Glasgow Jnr, ‘The Navy in Philip and Mary’s War, 1557-1558’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 53, no. 4 
(1967), 321-342; ‘The Navy in the First Elizabethan Undeclared War, 1559-1560’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 
54, no. 1 (1968), 23-37; ‘The Navy in the French Wars of Mary and Elizabeth I; Part III. The Navy in the 
Le Havre Expedition, 1562-1564’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 54, no. 3 (1968), 281-96. 
6 Glasgow, ‘Philip and Mary’s War’, 322-3. 
7 D. Loades, The Tudor Navy: An Administrative, Political and Military History (Cambridge, 1992), 7, 
192-9, N.A.M. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649 (London, 2004), 194-
5. 
8 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 195. 
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consider the impact of French naval strength in forcing the English kingdom to 
consolidate its own resources. 
 For England, the re-initiation of a naval construction scheme had become 
necessary after a decade of neglect. Since 1546, when the Tudor’s navy reached its 
apogee with 58 warships, the navy had fallen into disuse, and its warships were poorly 
maintained. Edward VI (1537-53) sold his father’s small rowbarges and several other 
vessels and failed to replace them.9 On 25 August 1553, the flagship of Henry VIII 
(1491-1547), the Henri Grace à Dieu (since renamed the Edward), was accidentally 
destroyed in a fire, through the negligence of her keepers at Woolwich. 10  As a 
consequence, by the autumn of 1555, the Queen’s warships numbered just 28, and many 
of these would have been unserviceable, including the Peter and the George Hoy. 
 The reduction in the English crown’s warships was clear, and with escalating 
friction between England and France, it became imperative for England to improve its 
naval resources. By the mid-sixteenth century, although continuing to hire and equip 
vessels to bolster their fleets, both crowns knew of the advantages in owning warships. 
As well as representing status and prestige, warships of the state were tailor designed 
and armed, for war at sea.  
 
9 The National Archives, Kew [TNA], [Records of the Exchequer] E351/2194, (29 September 1548–24 
October 1551); Printed in C.S. Knighton & D. Loades, ed., The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I 
(Cornwall, 2011), [referred to as NEM from here], 146-69. 
10 J.G. Nichols, ed., The Diary of Henry Machyn, Citizen and Merchant-Taylor of London (New York, 
1963), 43. 
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Prior to his accidental death in July 1559, the notorious fleet of Henri II (1519-
59) had been well established as a significant maritime fighting force. The naval 
reforms of Henri II even led Charles de La Roncière to refer to Henri as the ‘précurseur 
de Colbert’.11 Predominately consisting of galleys, whilst retaining several carracks as 
an auxiliary force, Henri’s personal naval armament had proved its worth in its 
adolescence when successfully recovering St Andrews Castle in July 1547.12 In this 
context, both the Marian and Elizabethan regimes realised that it was necessary to 
redevelop the English navy, if it were to compete on equal terms with its French 
equivalent. 
 Through firstly outlining how France’s navy expanded during the mid-sixteenth 
century, and then subsequently considering how England’s navy re-emerged between 
1555-64, it will be shown that the war with France was a major influence in the 
development of the English crown’s warships that would be celebrated for the victory of 
1588. It was the French wars of the mid-sixteenth century that acted as the original 
stimulus for naval growth in England. Without this conflict, the history of the 




11 C. de La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, III: Les  guerres d’Italie, liberté des mers (Paris, 
1906), 479. 
12 E. Bonner, ‘The Recovery of St Andrews Castle in 1547: French Naval Policy and Diplomacy in the 
British Isles’, The English Historical Review, 111, no. 442 (June, 1996), 578-598. 
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French naval developments 
For a sovereign who quickly developed imperial ambitions, Henri II inherited a rather 
unimpressive fleet. In spite of Martin du Bellay’s memoirs declaring that the July 1545 
French invasion fleet of the Solent consisted of 235 vessels, the King owned just a small 
fraction of these.13 The invasion fleet was predominately a conglomeration of merchant 
and other private vessels from the coasts of Picardy to Bordeaux, Provence, and the 
Italian States. The improvised nature of the fleet is observable in its Levant squadron, 
which departed from Marseille to Normandy on 14 May 1545.14 Under the command of 
Captain Paulin, général des galères, were 20-25 galleys, alongside a further 40 hired 
vessels of Biscayan, Genoese and French origin. 15  These additional hired vessels 
accompanied the fleet principally to transport soldiers for the invasion attempt, which 
relied upon the prospect of quickly reaching the English shoreline. 
 The warships that François I (1494-1547) actually owned were on the whole 
smaller than the Henrician equivalent. His largest warship, la Carraquon of 800 tuns, 
failed even to depart from Dieppe in July 1545, for a fire in her galley incapacitated the 
vessel prior to departure.16 The largest warships that Henri II would inherit would be the 
aged and somewhat decayed la Grande Maîtresse and la Cardinale, and neither was 
 
13 Martin du Bellay, Les memoires de mess. Martin du Bellay, seigneur de Langey (Paris, 1569), 338-9. 
14 TNA, [State Papers] SP 1/202, f. 30, (11 June 1545). 
15 TNA, SP 1/198, f. 71, (18 February 1545); TNA, SP 1/199, f. 195, (9 April 1545); Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France [BN], français 17329, f. 193, (22 January 1545). 
16 ‘Tun’ as opposed to the later sixteenth ‘ton’ measuring method is used here. W. Salisbury, ‘Early 
Tonnage Measurement in England’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 52, no. 1 (1966), 41-51. 
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larger than 600 tuns.17 With galleys and sailing vessels combined, the fleet that Henri 
inherited was inferior to that which Edward VI acquired on his accession. The French 
crown, thus, would have had little choice but to apply a greater reliance upon 
decentralised, privately owned ships. These vessels would not have necessarily been 
tailored for war in the same way that the bespoke warships of the Valois monarchy were 
constructed. 
 Soon after he came to the throne, Henri II addressed this maritime frailty by 
making the French state a major European threat at sea. With warfare being a regular 
occurrence during his short reign, Henri believed it to be important for France to 
establish itself with a powerful state navy. The recovery of St Andrews Castle in late 
July 1547 was the newly crowned King’s first overt military activity of his twelve-year 
reign. Led by Leone Strozzi, général des galères, 20-22 galleys were armed for the 
expedition.18 Henri’s limited inheritance in the Ponant (Atlantic) fleet is reflected in his 
selection of oared vessels for this expedition, which had to be transported from 
Marseille to Nantes before their embarkation.19 Galleys had long remained an integral 
component of the French naval war effort during the late medieval period, and the 
Italian Wars ensured their continued existence, with the relatively calm waters of the 
Mediterranean serving to accommodate the long-oared ship. Yet, their success in 
 
17 BN, français 18153, f. 34, (6 March 1547); for a study of la Grande Maîtresse see M. Guérot & B. 
Liou, La Grande Maîtresse nef de François Ier (Paris, 2001). 
18 BN, français 20449, ff. 75-6, (11 August 1547). 
19 Archives Municipales de Nantes, [Impots et Comptabilité] CC384, f. 13, (1550). 
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northern waters in 1547 confirmed that the French King would retain them for his future 
activities both in northern and southern Europe.20 His plans to recommence his father’s 
war with the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V – which would resume in 1551 – 
resulted in a new galley construction scheme that started almost immediately upon his 
accession. 
 On 12 July 1548, Henri began a galley-building programme that intended to 
maintain a fleet of 40 galleys.21 This oared fleet was to be predominantly located in the 
Levant (Mediterranean), where 30 vessels would be situated, whilst the remainder 
would be based in the Ponant region. Meanwhile, the French King also commissioned 
the construction of 20 rowbarges for the Mediterranean, which were presumably 
influenced by the earlier English design.22 Given his plans to recommence the Italian 
Wars, Henri conceived southern Europe as a greater threat to national security, and so 
the larger proportion of his galleys were logically located there. Not only was Charles V 
a maritime threat in the Mediterranean, but there was also a fear of piracy from the 
North African corsairs. 
 Whether Henri II retained any considerable interest in naval expansion in the 
Ponant after the Scottish expedition of July 1547 is questionable. The Ponant was 
starved of naval armament when compared to its southern equivalent. In response to a 
 
20 L. Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare in Europe, c. 1330-c.1680’ in F. Tallett & D.J.B. Trim, ed., European 
Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge, 2010), 244. 
21 BN, francais 18153, ff. 38r-40, (12 July 1548). 
22 BN, français 20008, ff. 12-3, (8 July 1582); J. Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts 
and the Transformation of Europe (London, 2000), 142-3. 
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report of January 1549 that eighteen galleys were being maintained in the Ponant, Henri 
ordered ‘que le nombre de dix huict gallaires qu’il entretient de present en lad[ict] mer 
soit reduict à dix attend quelles sont de grand despense’.23 In regulating naval strength 
and prioritising the Levant fleet, Henri was regressing French naval progress on the 
Atlantic front. This took place whilst galley construction in the Mediterranean 
continued into the final years of his reign. 24  In many ways this development was 
contrary to typical maritime progression at the time, for whilst England and the 
Netherlands were evolving northern Europe into a major frontier for sailing warships, 
Henri was focusing upon oared architecture in the Levant.  This had short-term benefits 
for France, as it became a considerable military presence at sea, and Henri was able to 
devise elaborate schemes for the use of galleys in both northern and southern waters.25 
In the long term, however, the reliance upon the Levant galley fleet would serve to 
hinder France’s sea power, when northern Europe was quickly emerging as a significant 
producer of sailing warships. Having experienced the might of Francis’s galleys in the 
Solent in July 1545, England had no reason to question that France would not send them 
north again; little did Mary I know that Henri’s galleys would be too preoccupied in the 
Mediterranean to entertain the English on the Channel. An early sign of France’s 
northern maritime weakness would materialise in 1562, when English and Huguenot 
 
23 BN, français 18153, f. 52, (6 January 1549). 
24 Archives Nationales, Paris [AN], [Extraits, copies et mémoires] U754, ff. 89-91, (4 January 1556). 
25 BN, français 3050, ff. 108-9, (1 August 1548). 
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troops captured Le Havre. Without Henri advocating a significant Ponant fleet, it would 
be difficult for such a force to develop in northern waters with his successors, whilst the 
political havoc of the Wars of Religion unfolded.26  
 This is not to suggest that the French crown possessed no sailing warships under 
Henri II. Although records are tenuous, François I’s successor inherited - at the very 
least - seven such ships.27 Amongst these were la Grande Maîtresse (600 tuns), la 
Cardinale (300 tuns) and several smaller vessels such as le St. Jehan (150 tuns). On 
account of their age and fragility, most of these were sold or abandoned in the opening 
years of his reign – la Grande Maîtresse was out of service before July 1557, when she 
was sold in Marseille – and Henri had a handful of new sailing warships constructed 
under his command.28 According to the available records, the warship most regularly 
equipped for service was la Grande Carraque (c. 600-800 tuns) based at Dieppe. This 
warship was in service by July 1555 and was still being armed against the English in 
July 1563.29 Her regular recording by name in accounts of armament – for the equipping 
of ‘notre navire nommé la grande Carraque et autres navires et vaisseaux’ – infers that 
the warship was the largest and most formidable within the fleet. 
 By 1555, Henri II controlled 40 galleys and a smaller collection of well-armed 
sailing warships – perhaps as many as 10 or 15 – alongside his rowbarges, which 
 
26 A. James, Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661 (Woodbridge, 2004), 11-31. 
27 BN, français 18153, ff. 34-5r, (6 March 1547); BN, Moreau 737, ff. 169-73, (c. 1547). 
28 AN, [Parlement de Paris; parlement civil] X1A8621, ff. 218-9, (7 July 1557). 
29 BN, français 21544, f. 28, (23 July 1563). 
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combined were more than capable of competing with the decayed and quantitatively 
inferior navy of Marian England.30 For England as a maritime nation, it was necessary 
to initiate a naval expansion and maintenance scheme if it was to compete with Henri 
II’s fleets. For if England was caught without an ally, the French crown’s two fleets 
could easily combine and present themselves as a formidable foe in the Ponant. 
 
England’s expansion 
Since 1551, no new warships had been constructed under the Tudor crown. The 
kingdom’s internal fragility, which had arisen from the Reformation and succession 
crisis, had diverted the state’s attention away from its decaying military resources at sea. 
This was reflected in the early Marian decision to sell the old hulls of her father’s 
warships the Grande Mistress, Hinde, Unicorn and Maidenhead for a combined value 
of just £65.31 At the same time, the sale of the crown’s newest naval asset, the Primrose  
(constructed in 1551), for £1000 in 1554, is representative of Mary’s general disinterest 
in her seaborne defences during the early years of her reign. 32  With no apparent 
intention to initiate a new construction or rebuilding scheme, the early Marian 
 
30 Jan Glete has provided similar estimates for Henri II’s fleet. J. Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, 
Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, I, (Stockholm, 1993), 127; Glete, Warfare 
at Sea, 142. 
31 TNA, E351/2195, (29 September 1554-25 December 1555); NEM, 414-23. 
32 Following the Primrose being loaned to a group of London merchants in 1553 for an expedition to 
Guinea, the vessel is likely to have been returned to the monarch in need of repair, and her sale in 
December 1554 must have been connected to this. 
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institution appears to have held no ambition to engage in international conflicts, against 
neither France nor any other power. 
 It soon became apparent, however, that a royal marriage with Charles V’s only 
son, the future Philip II, was increasingly likely, and this marriage indicated – despite 
much resistance - that the English monarch was to re-emerge as an active ruler on the 
European scene. In spite of The Act for the Marriage of Queen Mary to Philip of April 
1554 declaring that England was not obliged to provide military support for any of 
Philip and his father’s wars, England’s role in Europe was to expand. It had become 
apparent by as early as autumn 1554 that an alliance with Spain would create an 
adversary in France. The Anglo-Spanish marriage was a major concern for Henri II, 
who was fully aware of the ramifications that it could have on the European stage. For 
Henri, an Anglo-Spanish marriage would hinder his war efforts against Charles, because 
the possibility of an English threat would force France to stretch its land and sea forces 
across both northern and southern fronts. The last time France had done this, it 
surrendered Boulogne to Henry VIII. Although his attempts were futile, Henri II was 
desperate to prevent English involvement on the continent. He considered supporting 
the rebels in the Wyatt uprising of 1554, and welcomed into refuge several of its 
conspirators, once the rebellion had collapsed. The French King became increasingly 
willing to use all the resources at his disposal that did not ultimately constitute a 
declaration of war on England, in order to mitigate the capabilities of the royal couple. 
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This included encouraging piratical activities in the Channel, specifically supporting the 
work of the notorious English exiles Peter and Henry Killigrew.33 By the summer of 
1556, Peter Killigrew was commanding an insurgent squadron of between six and eight 
vessels, to England’s dismay, along the Channel. One of the vessels, la Sacrette, was 
Henri II’s own. Mary and her Council were displeased, and reacted with equal hostility 
by launching a royal squadron, which attacked and captured the majority of Killigrew’s 
fleet in July 1556. La Sacrette was not returned to the French King, but instead 
integrated into Mary’s navy, where it remained until 1559-60.34 Once defeated, and in 
the hands of the English authorities, Killigrew claimed that Admiral Gaspard de 
Coligny had offered him the rank of captain in the French navy, if he could prove 
himself worthy through his actions in the Channel.35  In light of Henri II allegedly 
breaking the peace treaty of 1546 through endorsing these actions, Mary’s Privy 
Council deliberated on whether to declare war on France.36 
 It was in the context of this escalating French hostility that the decision was 
made to begin the construction of new English warships. There is no evidence to 
suggest that in the autumn of 1555, when the first timbers of two new warships were 
laid down, that England was intending to declare war on France because of external 
 
33 D. Loades, England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy 1490-1690 (London, 2000), 
71-2; Glasgow, ‘The Navy in Philip and Mary’s War’, 324. 
34 TNA, SP 69/9, f. 83, (8 October 1556); TNA, SP 12/3, f. 131, (24 March 1559). The Sacrett was most 
likely scrapped because of her severe decay, which was documented in 1559. 
35 TNA, SP 69/8, f. 182, (19 June 1556); TNA, SP 11/7, f. 106, (July 1556); TNA, SP 11/9, f. 51, (21 
August 1556); TNA, SP 11/9, f. 45, (21 August 1556); TNA, SP 11/9, f. 68, (16 September 1556). 
36 The British Library [BL], Caligula EV, ff. 36-9, (c. 1556). 
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pressure from Philip. Indeed, having recovered from her early years of unrest that had 
witnessed a general neglect of the fleet, the crown now turned to its maritime defence, 
in light of the anticipated French opposition to the royal marriage. This was exacerbated 
by two recent events. Firstly, the fragile nature of her transition to the throne had 
heightened an awareness of the peril to England, should internal rebels be able to 
combine with international support, as had occurred with Killigrew. Secondly, an 
attempt to escort Philip to the continent from England in September 1555 had alerted 
the realm to its restricted state of provisions. The use of the English navy to accompany 
Philip, and the inadequacies of the old English vessels discovered through their use, 
would have been a factor in influencing the commission of the large warship 
frameworks that were constructed in the following months. It was important that their 
size was to reflect the stature of the monarchy; prestige was a vital trait to include in the 
construction of national warships. This was reflected in their choice of name: the Philip 
and Mary (450 tuns) and the Mary Rose (600 tuns) were constructed not only to 
revitalise the English navy with the possibility of conflict on the horizon, but also to 
celebrate English (and conceivably even Spanish) sea power. 
 The Queen and her Council were nonetheless aware of Henri’s naval 
capabilities, and had reason to be fearful of them. As early as September 1555, the 
English Admiralty had realised how vulnerable England’s shoreline was to attack, when 
considering the French fleet that was preparing in Dieppe and Le Havre on account of 
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Philip’s presence in England.37  It is no wonder that, at the same time, Philip was 
recommending that England’s ‘chief defence of the realm’ be moved from its docks in 
London to Portsmouth, ‘since their passage out of the River Thames is not easy, [so] the 
said ships ought to be at Portsmouth, so that from there they can the more easily go 
forth and serve.’38 Although there is no evidence to suggest that the subsequent English 
naval reforms were made under Philip’s orders, his presence in England surely had an 
influence on the decision. The soon to be King of Spain perceived England to be in 
danger of attack by France and, following the royal marriage, his recommendation to 
move the fleet to Portsmouth appears to have been designed to entice English naval 
activity against his enemy. Moreover, the departure of Philip from England later that 
year - when 15 of Mary’s warships and 2800 men were employed for five weeks to 
transport the King to the Netherlands at a cost of at least £9600 to the English crown 
(total naval expenditure for 1555 reached £26,524) - and the immediate decision to 
commence a new naval construction scheme for the first time in almost five-years 
cannot be unconnected.39 Philip’s presence in England whilst his war with France was 
on-going, must have provided England with the reality check required to advance its 
military capabilities at sea. 
 
37 BL, Otho EIX, f. 97, (24 September 1555). 
38 TNA, SP 11/6, f.26, (1555). Translated in TEM, 306-7. 
39 TNA, SP 11/6, f. 100, (18 November 1555); TNA, E351/2195, (29 September 1554-25 December 
1555); TEM, 414-23. 
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 Around the turn of 1555-56, Mary increased the number of warships 
commissioned for construction to three. The third, once completed, would be named the 
Golden Lion (500 tuns). There is little doubt that these warships would have been built 
under the pressure of impending war with France, which was officially declared in May 
1557.40 At this point, the navy’s treasurer, Benjamin Gonson, was provided with a by-
annual payment of £7000 for its ordinary upkeep.41 Despite this reform, either war 
erupted earlier than the Council of Marine Causes anticipated, or Mary’s new warships 
were delayed, because none of them were launched in time for the first campaign in the 
summer of 1557.42 It was not until 29 December that the first of these warships, the 
Philip and Mary, is recorded as being prepared, alongside twelve additional royal 
vessels, to patrol the Narrow Seas.43  Although her counterparts were all completed 
shortly after, it was not until May of the following year that they were first prepared 
together.44 By this stage, a surprise land offensive at Calais in January ended England’s 
continental possessions. With her new warships complete, in June, Mary and her 
Council planned to retaliate with a huge seaborne offensive on Brittany, that consisted 
 
40 BL, Caligula EV, f. 40, (May 1557). 
41 TEM, 309-10. 
42 TNA, SP 11/10, f. 84, (29 May 1557); Pepys Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge [PL] 2875, ff. 
13-4, (29 May 1557). 
43 TNA, SP 11/11, f. 141, (29 December 1557). 
44 TNA, SP 11/13, f. 19, (22 May 1558). 
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of 89 royal and privately owned vessels, and a further 60 smaller ships for victualing.45 
Assembling this fleet would prove pointless, as it was eventually divided into squadrons 
in May, in accordance with French military operations that had dispersed to Dunkirk, 
Brest and the Channel.46 The majority of the Queen’s warships (including those three 
newly built) were ordered to return to Portsmouth and await further instructions.47  
 Altogether, the naval campaigns of Mary I achieved nothing of value. Unable to 
be forecast, Henri II’s forces were too preoccupied with the Imperial conflict on land, 
and in the Mediterranean, to dedicate significant resources to counter Mary’s 
developing maritime resources. France’s response in the north, then, was one conducted 
largely through private warfare, and England failed to take advantage of this situation 
by taking the naval offensive. The war was, however, fundamentally important, for it 
acted as the stimulus for reviving the English navy, and although the fleet at Portsmouth 
in June 1558 would not have been as impressive as the English equivalent thirteen-years 
earlier, it nevertheless possessed new blood in the form of both its men and warships. 
Both the logistical programme for Elizabethan expansion and the strategic thinking that 
underpinned it had been adumbrated within the previous reign. 
 Before her death on 17 November 1558, Mary had introduced three large 
warships into her navy, alongside a handful of pinnaces. Moreover, sometime in her 
 
45  TEM, 358-63; considering that a proportionate number of these vessels were present solely for 
victualing, David Loades is likely to be correct that this fleet in truth consisted of around 55 warships. 
Loades, The Tudor Navy, 173. 
46 TNA, SP 11/13, ff. 5, 14, 19, (11 May 1558-22 May 1558). 
47 TNA, SP 11/13, f. 17, (22 May 1558). 
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final months – possibly during the main campaigning season of 1558 – an additional 
vessel had begun its construction at Woolwich that when nearing completion would be 
recorded as 800 tuns.48 This vessel – that was formerly to be named after her brother – 
continued in its production after Elizabeth’s succession. When just months away from 
her launch, the Book of Sea Causes (a thorough report on the navy’s existing condition) 
produced on 24 March 1559, declared that, as the largest warship of Elizabeth’s early 
fleet, the new vessel would hold 550 men.49 Elizabeth was to show through the Book of 
Sea Causes, that even during the opening years of her reign, she was willing to not only 
continue, but also expand on her sister’s redevelopment programme. This detailed 
survey of the navy and its ordnance acknowledged that Elizabeth’s predecessors had 
witnessed the decay of the English fleet, in spite of Mary’s reforms surrounding the 
French war. It declared that only 22 of the Queen’s warships – including the yet 
unfinished 800 tun unnamed ship at Woolwich – were serviceable and suitable ‘to be 
kept and preserved for the service of Her Majesty’.50 Meanwhile, a further ten including 
the Sacrett and the experienced and aged Salamander ‘be very much worn and of no 
continuance without great repairations’. The extent of their damage appeared so 
extreme that it was recommended that they be sold for profit. 
 
48 TNA, SP 12/3, f. 131, (24 March 1559). 
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 Elizabeth appears to have listened to this advice, for action was swiftly taken to 
improve the state of the navy, for along with the dismissal of several recommended 
warships in a poor condition, by 1561 seven new vessels had been integrated into her 
navy. This included the 800 tun warship that started its construction under Mary I. 
London merchant, Henry Machyn recorded in his diary how on ‘the iij day of July 
[1559] (the) Quene(’s) grace toke her barge at Grenwyche unto Wolwyche to her nuw 
shype, and ther yt was namyd Elesabeth Jon[as,] and after here grace had a goodly 
bankett, and ther was grett shutyng of gunes…for plesur.’51 Although named after the 
new Queen, this warship was Mary I’s final contribution to the navy. Mary’s legacy for 
the English navy was to inspire her sister to continue constructing warships of a similar 
size to the Elizabeth Jonas: three further warships of around an equal size would be 
constructed for Elizabeth’s navy before the signing of the Treaty of Troyes on 11 April 
1564, which officially concluded Anglo-French hostilities. 
 Mary’s overall contribution to the English navy was considerable, both through 
what she achieved in her final years, and through what she inspired her successor to 
continue. In less than three years, Mary reformed her navy’s financial administration 
through providing it with a by-annual income. She also commenced the construction of 
four large warships and several pinnaces, and also began to rebuild the decaying fleet. 
The Jennet and the Swallow, both of 200 tuns, were reconstructed during the Marian 
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French war.52 Both Mary and her sister also integrated several captured French prizes 
into their fleets. Elizabeth’s Book of Sea Causes, then, should not only be perceived as a 
reflection of the navy’s deterioration prior to 1558; it should also serve as a reminder of 
the steps made under Mary I’s reign for the navy’s progression. After all, over one-
quarter of the warships that were declared serviceable in 1559, had been newly made or 
repaired between 1555-58.  
The naval advancements coordinated during the first decade of Elizabeth’s reign 
did not indicate a shift in policy from that of her sister, but instead suggest a 
continuation of it. The Book of Sea Causes serves as a mid-season report on the 
progression and restoration of England’s military forces at sea within the continuing 
context of conflict with France. The Elizabethan naval developments initiated from 
1559 were not a new phase in English construction, but were a consolidation of 
measures that were already in place, and were gradually gathering momentum. 
 As with the Marian commissioned Elizabeth Jonas, no definitive date has 
appeared that determines exactly when, under Elizabeth, the decision was made to 
commission the construction of a series of new warships for her navy. It is nevertheless 
a fair assumption that the intention to bolster the English fleet with new vessels had 
been well established with the Book of Sea Causes. This document declared that in 
selling the decayed warships within her fleet, ‘with [these] charges being so saved, 
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wilbe a great helpe towarde the making of the New Shipps.’53 This concept of out with 
the old and in with the new was strictly followed. On 30 September 1562, Francis Lee 
of Rotherhithe paid £80 for the 140 tun Jerfalcon.54 The very same day the annual 
Quarterly Accounts recorded the official launching of Elizabeth’s first sister ships: the 
Triumph and the Victory.55 Both warships were constructed at Deptford – the naval 
epicentre of the English fleet until Chatham later replaced Deptford in this role – and 
were a considerable burden to the year’s revenue, when the annual total expenditure of 
the navy reached £25,951 16s 2d ‘where of 12,000l is of the ordenary yerely assignment 
and the rest encreased by reson of the newe making of two greate shippes this yere and 
by provision of cordage and sayle canvas bought and provided for store.’56 Considering 
that the Triumph was some 200 tuns larger than her sister ship, it is likely that a record 
dated 13 January 1561, stored at Hatfield House that reports the Triumph’s cost at 
£3788 – whilst excluding certain necessary amenities such as sails and other fittings – is 
conservative in its estimate.57 Two years later, Elizabeth would also launch the White 
Bear, of a comparatively colossal size to the Triumph.58 Without even considering the 
rebuilds, prizes or smaller ship constructions that were introduced from 1555-64, Mary 
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and Elizabeth would oversee the introduction of seven, 450 tun or larger warships into 
the English navy during the French wars. 
 It is equally important to consider the Elizabethan naval developments within 
the context of the on-going French conflict. In a change of heart, Mary and her Council 
were considering opportunities for peace with France during the final months of her life, 
and Elizabeth I was eager to conclude her sister’s regrettable conflict, especially if the 
restoration of Calais was on the negotiating table.59 This is far from saying, however, 
that the relationship between England and France, from the signing of the Treaty of 
Cateau-Cambrésis in April 1559 to the Huguenot-English pact in September 1562, was 
one of complete harmony.60 Secretly state-endorsed hostile actions, hidden behind a veil 
of deceit, would remain present during this period of supposed tranquillity, leaving both 
kingdoms with little reason to doubt that their neighbour across the Channel remained a 
threat to the state. This anxiety that animated Marian naval expansion, would continue 
to be the formative factor for the development of the fleet in early Elizabethan England. 
Of these instances, the most important to emphasise surrounds the marriage of the 
young Francis II to Mary Queen of Scots in April 1558. To England’s dismay, the 
marriage that had strengthened the Auld Alliance permitted French garrisons to situate 
themselves in Scotland. Elizabeth and her Council notably felt considerable unease 
towards the French threat materialising north of the border, and on 16 December 1559 
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reacted by ordering William Winter to patrol the Firth of Forth. 61  Winter was to 
intercept French shipping with a fleet of 34 vessels, and was commanded to act ‘as 
though on his own initiative’, in doing so formally disassociating his actions from 
Elizabeth’s command. If Winter’s activity was officially state-endorsed it would serve 
to breach the peace, and would have provided France with the justification to use its 
forces stationed in Scotland, against England. By 22 January 1560, Winter’s fleet was 
blockading the northern waters, preventing the communication of the French garrison 
stationed at Leith with Fife, which would quickly become a stronghold for the Lords of 
the Congregation.62 Whilst situated there, Winter captured two of the French crown’s 
galleys, which were integrated into the English fleet as the Tryright and the Speedwell.63 
It was with the knowledge of this English success, and the awareness of the possible 
French repercussions produced from English involvement, that the decision was made 
to begin the construction of the Triumph and the Victory in the spring-summer of that 
year. 
 Nor were Elizabeth’s new warships limited to her three giants: the Triumph, 
Victory and White Bear. On 6 October 1562, the 300 tun Aid was launched at Deptford, 
and was victualed for service by the end of the year.64 The Aid would accompany the 
400 tun Hope produced in 1560, alongside a number of short-lived smaller brigantines, 
 
61 TNA, SP 12/7, f. 171, (16 December 1559); BL, Caligula BX, ff. 65-6, (16 December 1559). 
62 J. E. A. Dawson, ‘William Cecil and the British Dimension of Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy’, The 
Journal of the Historical Association, 74, no. 241 (1989), 209-11. 
63 TNA, E351/2358, (1 January 1559-1 January 1561). 
64 TNA, SP 12/26, f.27, (17 December 1562). 
 24 
and pinnaces, such as the Post and the Makeshift. The new energy represented by this 
expansion was necessary with a French war on the horizon. By the end of September 
1562, Elizabeth had signed the Treaty of Hampton Court with the Huguenot leader, the 
Prince of Condé. In exchange for economic aid and 3000 English troops, the Huguenots 
supplied the port town of Le Havre to the Queen as a pledge for the return of Calais. 
This pact had repercussions for the English when, on 19 March 1563, the Edict of 
Amboise was signed concluding the first French War of Religion, and leaving English 
troops stranded, and in a very difficult position in northern France. With French internal 
hostilities temporarily resolved, Catherine de Medici was free to apply the French 
military’s attention to the unwelcome English presence that occupied Le Havre. The 
Queen Mother ordered an army to assemble around Le Havre, and requested that the 
inhabitants of Dieppe ‘armer et equipper ung bon nombre de navires et à se mectre en 
mer pour deffendre les subjectz du Roy’.65 Meanwhile, the Channel was experiencing a 
particularly foul bout of weather, causing the English navy a number of difficulties in 
sustaining the Le Havre expedition. In April, whilst sailing to Portsmouth, a tempest 
caused the Greyhound to founder off the coast of Rye, along with most of her 120-man 
crew, including her captain John Malyn.66 This was just one sign that it was time for the 
English to retreat from Le Havre and, by the spring, an army of 16,000 French, German 
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and Swiss mercenaries had surrounded the town, putting the English garrison placed 
there in a complex position, given that the Queen’s warships could not compete against 
the forces on land. The decision was made, therefore, on 28 July 1563, to abandon the 
French town, and eagerly await the signing of the Treaty of Troyes of April 1564.67 
Despite the navy’s preparations, the Le Havre expedition was a conflict that ‘could not 
be won at sea’, for it was land forces, not ship-power, that caused the ultimate failure of 
Elizabeth’s exploits in France.68 
 Elizabeth’s large warships, that played such a prominent role during her early 
construction programme, found limited use during the Le Havre expedition beyond 
patrolling the Narrow Seas. In fact, perhaps the only occasion when they could have 
served to relieve the Le Havre garrison came in July 1563; at which point it was too 
late. When a relief fleet assembled consisting of three galleys, three brigantines, the 
Elizabethan Jonas, Victory, Lion and the Philip and Mary, it arrived at Le Havre to 
discover that Ambrose Dudley, the Earl of Warwick and commander of the Le Havre 
expedition, had already surrendered.69 Instead, with the narrow waterways of northern 
France preventing the use of the largest of the Tudor warships, it was the smaller sailing 
and oared vessels of Elizabeth’s fleet that would be of greater use in complementing the 
English war effort. Yet, Elizabeth and Mary controlled a very small number of oared 
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vessels when compared to the French competition. These were restricted to the Red 
Galley – the renamed Galley Subtle constructed in July 1543 – which had fallen into 
disuse under the two queens and was decommissioned prior to 1564, and the Black 
Galley, which was a French prize captured in late 1548. 70 The Black Galley was also 
last recorded as a part of the English fleet in 1564. 71 Finally, there were the French 
prizes collected under Elizabeth; these included the Speedwell, the Tryright, and the 
Galley Eleanor, which was received in 1562 from the Prince of Condé as part of the 
Treaty of Hampton Court.72  Additionally, both Elizabeth and her sister constructed 
several smaller brigantines and pinnaces that could have used oars for more effective 
manoeuvrability in the narrow channels of northern France. These included the Post, the 
Search, the Guide and the Makeshift, and all of which were designed for travel in the 
French waters, and were considered expendable, for none would be in the service of the 
Queen by 1570. Although the navy was not the pivotal military resource that the Marian 
and early Elizabethan regimes desired, there is little doubt that the French wars 
bolstered the number of vessels that England possessed, even if several of these vessels 
served only for a short-time. 
 It is important to emphasise that, by expanding the fleet to include an increased 
number of smaller vessels that could use oars, England was adapting to the enemy that 
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it was encountering. Henri II’s expansion of his galley fleet and his employment of 
rowbarges, forced England to alter its fleet so that it could compete on similar terms. By 
focusing its offensive efforts upon France’s northern coast, and in particular upon Le 
Havre from 1562-63, England also designed several vessels that were sleek, nimble, 
cost-effective and highly manoeuvrable to navigate the narrow waterways. 73  This 
restricted the larger warships constructed, including the Elizabeth Jonas and the Victory 
to patrolling and defending the Narrow Seas, and to transporting goods between 
England and the garrison at Le Havre. 
 For the aspiring English dream of continental power, the French wars were a 
total failure. The loss of Calais and the retreat from Le Havre caused Elizabethan 
England to begin to accept its status as an island state that held no land on the continent. 
In terms of naval power, however, the years 1555-64 were pivotal in reminding the 
realm that, as an island, it was also a sea power. Writing to the Queen on 28 April 1560, 
Nicholas Throckmorton summarised this developing attitude most appropriately: 
 
The greatest defence you have is the sea, which being the wall of your 
Realme is cheefely to be gardyd. And therfore seing your Majeste hathe no 
sure meanes for landing on this syde [France]… greate regard is to be had to 
kepe them from landing in your Realme whereunto nothing can so well 
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serve, as to contynewe your navye strong and by the advise of the wise, and 
experienced men of your Realme, to devise means how the same may be 
maintayned and increasyd.74 
 
Concluding remarks 
Although the Spanish War and the celebrated 1588 Armada is often claimed to have 
witnessed the emergence of England as a naval power, this article has argued that it was 
during the years that surrounded the French wars from 1555-64, that the English navy 
truly came into its own. The French wars were without doubt a total failure for the 
kingdom’s continental ambitions, yet they encouraged the redevelopment of the English 
fleet. Although under Mary, the English navy’s revival was in reaction to the French 
threat, during the early years of Elizabeth’s reign its purpose was refined as a deliberate, 
and permanent, form of defence. Many of the warships constructed in these years would 
act as a vital component of the English fleet of 1588. Mary I’s three large warships, the 
Philip and Mary, the Mary Rose and the Golden Lion, were evidently well constructed, 
for all three were in service in 1588; the Mary Rose may not have required refitting until 
as late as 1589.75 
 By the end of the Tudor dynasty, the crown and kingdom could praise its royal 
warships, which included five vessels that were estimated at 800 tons or more. Four of 
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these – the Triumph, the Elizabeth [Jonas], the White Bear and the Victory – were built 
prior to 1564, whilst the fifth, the Ark Royal, was purchased from Sir Walter Raleigh in 
1587.76  This suggests that, after 1564, Elizabeth I’s desire for large and imposing 
warships began to fade, as defence became her strategic priority.77  This was likely 
influenced by two factors. Firstly, 1564 marked the end of the Anglo-French wars, and 
France ceased to be a major threat to English defence thereafter because of its own 
internal instability. With England’s traditional adversary impaired and distracted, 
Elizabethan England entered a twenty-year period where its presence in continental 
conflicts remained minimal. Secondly, the influence of Sir John Hawkins in the Council 
of Marine Causes from 1570, resulted in the backing of the smaller and sleeker race-
built galleon model, which caused a natural reduction in the size of warships integrated 
into the Elizabethan navy.78 
 It is important to take into account that, although the early modern spectator was 
unlikely to have been aware of it at the time, England was consolidating its naval forces 
from the late 1550s, whilst the French navy was gradually declining. Despite Henri II’s 
naval resources being superior to the English equivalent in 1555, by 1564 this balance 
had been reversed. It is likely that the quantitative demise of the French navy occurred 
in the years after Henri death, when the French navy encountered both civil and 
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international warfare. By 1566, France’s naval resources in the Ponant were 
insignificant; the King’s warships may have totalled as little as five.79  Even in the 
Levant, where Henri II’s fleet had been proportionately superior, it is unlikely that the 
crown’s galleys amounted to more than ten.80 With the French kingdom experiencing a 
bloody civil war, and with its navy impaired, the French state would not be a threat to 
the English at sea for some time to come. This decline in France does not serve to 
disprove that English naval advancement was a product of the French threat, for the 
initial stimulus that triggered English developments in the mid-sixteenth century had 
already transpired before the reduction in French naval strength was obvious for 
contemporary statesmen to observe. 
 France’s naval weakness after 1564 does correlate with an English decline in the 
use of oared vessels. The reduced presence of oared vessels in northern waters, 
following France’s naval deterioration, diminished the necessity for English galleys to 
be maintained. Only the Eleanor was used after 1564, and it was not until the final years 
of Elizabeth’s reign that the questionable decision was made to construct five galleys 
for the English fleet again. After the Le Havre expedition, English galleys found little 
purpose in a maritime world where the theatre of war was placed at a substantial 
distance from the English shoreline. Galleys were designed to travel short distances, and 
to manoeuvre in tricky waterways. Once France was no longer England’s adversary, 
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they became largely obsolete along the Channel. As travel across the Atlantic became 
more regular, and a new emerging enemy was found in southern rather than northern 
Europe, it became increasingly necessary for the English navy to incorporate more 
effective sailing warships into its fleet. 
 The relationship between England and France was fundamental in shaping 
England’s navy. Declaring war against France in 1557, Mary I and her Council were 
aware of the improvements that were required to the Queen’s ships, if they were to 
compete against the might of Henri II’s warships. Equally, the early Elizabethan policy 
for the navy was to continue Mary’s design by ensuring a permanent force was 
maintained. Both monarchs, then, constructed both large and small warships, whilst 
rebuilding older vessels, and also integrating French prizes such as the Sacrett into the 
fleet. This was important, for it meant that, when peace with France was concluded with 
the Treaty of Troyes, the Elizabethan navy did not have to be completely rebuilt from 
scratch, but instead by looking beyond the horizon as opposed to the other side of the 
Channel, it could be gradually remodelled and improved. Consequently, without the 
French wars of 1557-64, it is unlikely that the fighting strength of the English navy 
would have been up to the task of facing the might of Spain at sea. 
